It is common for tensions to arise between the upstream and downstream users of large dams. Some well-known examples include the Attaturk Dam on the Euphrates River and the Pa Mong Dam on the Mekong. One less renowned example, but equally, if not more serious and conflictual involves Tajikistan and its downstream neighbours, particularly Uzbekistan.

As the upstream countries in Central Asia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan posses nearly 90% of the region’s water resources and control the heads of Central Asia’s major rivers. However, the majority of water in Central Asia is consumed by the downstream countries- Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan- with the latter consuming the most. This upstream-downstream dichotomy has often been a source of tension and it has been suggested that conflict could ensure if a solution is not agreed upon soon. The key issue is the downstream states growing consumption of water for summer irrigation mirrored against the upstream states withholding of water to generate power for winter heating needs.

The two upstream countries face an annual energy deficit because they lack significant oil and gas resources. Therefore they have consistently sought recognition of water as a commodity that should be bartered against their neighbours coal and gas. In contrast, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan maintain that water flows across boundaries and thus is a shared rather than a private good. Further disagreements have occurred as some states, notably Kazakhstan, have made it government policy to generate as little of their own energy as possible, aiming to import from cheaper sources elsewhere in the region and therefore preserving their hydrocarbons for export (often to Tajikistan) (Wegerich et al 2007).

Many of the water-related issues in Tajikistan revolve around the incumbent governments hydropower ambitions and the Nurek, Rogun and Sangtuda dam complexes.

Currently, Tajikistan seeks to increase hydropower production by changing the Nurek dams mode of operation and by completing the construction of the Rogun dam upstream of Nurek. To do so, Tajikistan has managed to attract foreign investors to its energy sector. In 2004, RUSAL, Russia’s world-class aluminium producer signed a deal under which it will finish the Rogun power station on the Vakhsh River and later that year, Russia’s company United Energy Systems started constructing Sangtuda-1, while Iran helped finance construction of Sangtuda-2.

Uzbekistan is adamant that the construction of any of these dams is a direct threat to its agricultural production because it would not receive enough water for irrigation. Spoor and Krutov noted that the Uzbek leadership is highly critical of the Rogun dam because they perceive that it would put Tajikistan firmly in control of the river. When fully operational, the Rogun, Sangtuda 1+2, the Nurek, the Baipaza and several smaller power stations will allow for long-term control and manipulation of the flow of the Vakhsh. This will make Tajikistan a leading energy exporter in the region and thus secure a more dominant position within Central Asia politics. Uzbekistan fears this situation as it would endow Tajikistan with significant leverage over the Uzbek economy and domestic affairs and this is something that appeals to neither Uzbekistan’s national security agenda nor Islam Karimov’s authoritarian mentality.

Tajikistan is seeking to attract investors to an even larger project, the Dashtijum hydropower station on the Panj River- another tributary of the Amu Darya- and refurbish the Kayrakkum power station on the Syr Darya. These ambitious plans have immediately caused serious tensions with its water-starved neighbour and have created a volatile water security environment in the region. As Uzbekistan’s economy and development largely depends on transboundary rivers, it could be suggested that water in Tajik-Uzbek relations has been elevated from a political dispute to a potential cause of conflict.

It must be acknowledged however, that Tashkent is unlikely to use the threat of force against Tajikistan, as it did in the 1990s, mainly because Russia, China, US and other external powers are interested in the stable development of the broader region and will. Moreover, aggravating tensions will only add to Tajikistan’s firm resolve to secure strategic advantages over its unfriendly neighbour.

The Future

There are still many uncertainties in regards to the future of hydropower in Tajikistan. Wegerich raised queries about who might be the potential buyers for energy produced using Tajikistan’s dams. It was originally anticipated that electricity could be exported to Uzbekistan, but since independence Uzbekistan has followed a policy of energy self-sufficiency and therefore, has not opened up its energy sector to imports from Tajikistan.

Consequently, Tajikistan renegotiated a deal to sell surplus energy to Russia, or rather to southern Kazakhstan in a swap for energy delivered to Russia from generators in Northern Kazakhstan. Although this scheme appears economically viable, Parshin suggested that IFIs would not support new construction plans unless Tajikistan’s neighbours concur. Spoor and Krutov argue ‘in view of the balance of power in the region, Uzbekistan will never allow this to happen’. Uzbekistan’s failure to agree led Tajikistan to seek financial support from Iran and Russia . Although it is not discussed in any of the academic literature, it is noteworthy that Tajikistan appears to have aligned with Russia and Iran, whereas Uzbekistan has often partnered with the USA (over Vozrozdenhyie for example).

Although little information has been written about the project and the current situation in Afghanistan does not seem conducive to such a project, in Feb 2006, Tajikistan, Iran and Afghanistan supposedly signed a deal under which they will build a ‘Trans-Afghan’ power line from Rogun and other power stations on the Vakhsh river to Mashhad in northwest Iran via Mazar-I-Sharif in Afghanistan. Pakistan, India and eventually China are also expected to consume Tajik electricity in the future.

There are few clear solutions to the aforementioned problems and similar to many other problems in Central Asia, bilateral or multilateral dialogue is often (wrongly) suggested as the default panacea. In order to conceptualise a solution that is agreeable to all parties, it is important that water management focuses on the basin level and on integrated approaches. Furthermore, it is necessary to stop political discussions on the construction of large dams being presented as zero-sum games, in which the upstream country has benefits and the downstream country in some way becomes subservient.